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ABSTRACT: According to a standard story, part of what we have in mind
when we say that an argument is valid is that it is necessarily truth
preserving: if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true.
But—the story continues—that’s not enough, since ‘Roses are red,
therefore roses are coloured’ for example, while it may be necessarily
truth-preserving, is not so in virtue of form. Thus we arrive at a standard
contemporary characterisation of validity: an argument is valid when it is
NTP in virtue of form. Here I argue that we can and should drop the N;
the resulting account is simpler, less problematic, and performs just as
well with examples.
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1. A Standard Story About Validity
According to a standard story, part of what we have in mind in calling an argument
valid—in the sense of logically, or formally, valid—is that it is necessarily
truth-preserving. That is, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Or in
other words, it’s impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. The
customary motivation for this use of modal notions is as follows. Suppose we call an
argument materially truth-preserving, or simply truth-preserving, when it is not the
case that its premises are true and its conclusion false. Now, while arguments that fail to
be materially truth-preserving are certainly invalid, there are other invalid arguments
which are materially truth-preserving. For example,
Argument 1:
Socrates is mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is a philosopher.
is materially truth-preserving, because the conclusion is true. But it’s not valid,
because—according to the standard story—while both premise and conclusion happen
to be true, it’s nevertheless possible for the premise to be true and the conclusion false.
Therefore, the story goes, part of what we have in mind in calling an argument valid is
that it is necessarily truth preserving (NTP).
But, the story continues, this is still not enough. There are NTP arguments which are not
valid in the relevant sense. For example,
Argument 2:
Roses are red.
Therefore, roses are coloured.
This is NTP because red things are necessarily coloured. However, while it may be a
conceptual truth that red things are coloured, it’s not a truth of logic. It has to do with
the particular meanings of ‘red’ and ‘coloured’. If we had to deal with such matters in our
account of logic, there would be no hope of stating a comprehensive logical theory in a
single book. (Drawing the line between form and content, and how theoretically
significant the line is, are fraught issues, but they can be put aside for present purposes;
here I am going along with the standard story except for the part I think should be




All red things are coloured.
Therefore, roses are coloured.
This argument is valid, the story goes, because not only is it NTP—it is so in virtue of
form. In other words, its form makes it the case that it’s NTP.1 Forget about the particular
content of the argument, we can still see that it’s NTP, just based on its form. It doesn’t
matter what ‘red’ or ‘coloured’ means, it doesn’t matter what ‘roses’ means. We could
tell that the argument is NTP even if we didn’t know the particular meanings of those
words; all we need to know is their logico-grammatical category (they’re predicates).
Argument 2, by contrast, is NTP but is not NTP in virtue of form. We can see this by
reflecting that other arguments with the same form are not NTP. For example,
Argument 4:
1 Just as I am not getting into issues about what counts as form, i.e. about the boundary between
the logical and the extra-logical, I will not attempt to theorise here about ‘in virtue of’, e.g. about
whether it indicates a metaphysical grounding relation, something less objective having to do
with explanation, or whatever. I take it that we have a working understanding of ‘in virtue of’ in
this context, it’s already part of the standard story I’m arguing that we can simplify, and I’m just
leaving it in place. (In this connection, note that I’m only arguing that the simplified story is
preferable to the standard one—not that it’s preferable to all other characterisations of validity.)
Having said that, there is a noteworthy analogy between what I am arguing in this paper and the
trend of “post-modal metaphysics”, wherein philosophical ideas are articulated not with modal
notions but with a notion of grounding often expressed using ‘in virtue of’. It’s just that in the
present context, the ‘in virtue of’ has been in the picture all along—we just need to take it
seriously and realise that it already does the work for which the modal notion of necessity was
brought in.
Roses are red.
Therefore, roses are blue.
(This is of the same form as Argument 2, since ‘coloured’ and ‘blue’ belong to the same
logico-grammatical category.)
Thus we arrive at a standard contemporary account of what validity consists in:
necessary truth-preservation in virtue of form. Some authors use ‘valid’ just to mean
‘necessarily truth-preserving’, and then consider the view that logically or formally valid
arguments are ‘valid in virtue of form’, but given that by ‘valid’ I here mean logically or
formally valid, these authors are also considering the standard story I am interested in,
albeit in different terminology.2
2. The Proposal: Go Straight to ‘In Virtue Of Form’
My proposal is simple: the standard story is needlessly complicated. Once we have ‘in
virtue of form’ on board, we can drop the N in NTP. No detour through a notion of
necessity is required.
To begin to see this, let’s return to the beginning of the standard story while bearing in
mind how it ends—namely, by bringing in ‘in virtue of form’. Argument 1 is materially
truth-preserving (or, as I’ll say, simply ‘truth-preserving’, or ‘TP’3), i.e. it’s not the case
that its premise is true and its conclusion is false; in particular, both premise and
conclusion are true. But it’s not valid. This supposedly motivates bringing in a notion of
necessity. But hold on, we know where this story ends: with ‘in virtue of form’. So let’s
cut a long story short by bringing ‘in virtue of form’ on board at this point. Argument 1 is
TP, but it’s not TP in virtue of form. And we can see this by reflecting that other
arguments with the same form fail to be TP. For example,
Argument 5:
JFK is mortal.
Therefore, JFK is a philosopher.
3 Note in this connection that some authors use ‘truth-preserving’ as short-hand for ‘necessarily
truth-preserving’. In their terminology, the standard characterisation of validity may sound
deceptively like my simpler proposal.
2 This standard story, expressed in my preferred terminology, is found for instance in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on ‘Logical Consequence’ (Beall, Restall & Sagi
(2019), §3.1), the popular textbook Smith (2012), pp. 14 - 20, and two recent doctoral theses,
Reagan (2018), p. 4 and Bice (2019), pp. 173 - 174. The variant where ‘valid’ is taken to mean
just ‘necessarily truth-preserving’ and then our topic - logical or formal validity - is explained as
‘validity in virtue of form’ is found for instance in Read (1994), p. 250, Shapiro (2002), p. 230,
Smith (2003), p. 117 and MacFarlane (2021), p. 130.
This has a true premise and a false conclusion, i.e. is not TP. The plain old TP account of
validity is a non-starter, since it massively overgenerates, i.e. it counts lots of intuitively
invalid arguments as valid. The NTP account (with no ‘in virtue of form’) also
overgenerates, albeit less flagrantly. But we can fix these overgeneration problems in
one fell swoop by adding ‘in virtue of form’ to the plain old TP account. On the resulting
simple account, validity is just TP in virtue of form. Analogous accounts are available for
other properties and relations of logical interest. For instance, logical equivalence is
material equivalence—i.e. sameness of truth-value—in virtue of form. And logical truth
is truth in virtue of form.4
To be clear, it is no part of this proposal that there are valid arguments which aren’t NTP.
Plausibly, all arguments which are TP in virtue of form are also NTP (in more than one
interesting sense of ‘necessarily’). The proposal is just that we don’t need the N in NTP
in order to characterise validity. That valid arguments necessarily preserve truth can
naturally be seen as flowing from the fact that they are valid, without literally being part
of the idea or part of our account of validity.
In short, we can—and therefore should—drop the N in the standard ‘NTP in virtue of
form’ explanation of validity. I turn now to defending in a bit more detail the view that
the resulting simpler account (which I’ll call ‘TP-Form’) is preferable to the standard
more complicated one (‘NTP-Form’).
3. Defense of the Proposal
The most obvious way in which TP-Form is preferable to NTP-Form is that it is simpler,
in the straightforward sense that NTP-Form is just like TP-Form but with an extra bit.
Since TP-Form performs just as well with regard to examples, this alone gives us reason
to favour it.
A further benefit is that we avoid the problem of exactly which notion of necessity is best
suited to play the role of N in NTP. Should the N in NTP be understood in terms of
metaphysical necessity, a priori knowability, or in some other way? This can feel
somewhat arbitrary, which, from the point of view of my proposal, looks like evidence
that validity itself is better characterised by TP-Form than by NTP-Form. In this way, my
proposal comports well with the following conjecture of MacFarlane’s:
[...] one might worry about characterizing logical consequence in terms of
necessity or apriority. These notions are philosophically controversial. There is
debate, for example, about whether anything can be known a priori at all, but
4 Compare: ‘The fundamental characteristic of logic, obviously, is that which is indicated when
we say that logical propositions are true in virtue of their form.’ (Russell (1903), p. xvi.)
those who deny this are not typically skeptics about the relation of logical
consequence. Some philosophers have argued that there can be empirical
reasons for rejecting the validity of certain inference forms of propositional logic
(Quine 1951; Putnam 1968). This suggests that our basic understanding of
logical consequence is not tied to any notion of necessity or apriority.
(MacFarlane (2021), p. 126.)
This in turn highlights a third potential benefit of TP-Form over NTP-Form: greater
ideological parsimony. Arguably, TP-Form does not require any modal notions, whereas
NTP-Form does. This however depends on it being the case that we do not require any
modal notions in order to explain ‘in virtue of form’, which I will not try to argue for
here.
You might think that one way in which NTP-Form is preferable to TP-Form is that the
former displays a clear relationship between logical and extra-logical entailments. If you
simply delete ‘in virtue of form’, you’re left with a notion of extra-logical entailment,
whereas the notion of validity as characterised by TP-Form may seem to stand isolated.
This appearance, however, does not stand up to scrutiny. If we drill down a little into
what we mean by the ‘form’ in ‘in virtue of form’, we can begin to see this, and that by
replacing ‘form’ with something else we can obtain extra-logical notions of entailment.
The way I like to think about it, ‘in virtue of form’ means something like ‘in virtue of the
semantic properties of logical terms, as well as logically significant categories of
expression and modes of composition’. By widening this base, so that it includes for
example the meanings of terms like ‘red’ and ‘coloured’, we can obtain extra-logical
notions of entailment.
Finally, note that I am not claiming that TP-Form is perfect or that it is preferable to all
other characterisations of validity. You might for instance think that when we say that
the conclusion of a valid argument must follow from the premises, we mean something
more than that the argument is TP in virtue of form, e.g. that the premises support (or
lead to, etc.) the conclusion.5 But this is just as much of a worry for NTP-Form. All I am
arguing here is that TP-Form is an improvement over the popular and widespread
NTP-Form.
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